Paper Title
Reward Program and Information Sharing Under Different Contracts

Abstract
When a manufacturer opens an online channel to compete with its retailer, it’s an effective mechanism for the manufacturer to provide monetary support to the retailer to implement a reward points program to alleviate the O2O (online to offline) competition. However, the manufacturer and the retailer have asymmetric information about consumers’ redemption rate on earned reward points. In this research, we propose two contracts for the manufacturer to employ in order to seek sharing the retailer’s private information. Our results show that when the manufacturer offers the retailer a two-part tariff contract, the retailer would like to share its private information with the manufacturer only under certain condition; however, when the manufacturer offers the retailer a RPM (retail price maintenance) contract, the retailer has a strong selfmotivation to share its private information with the manufacturer since RPM contract creates a win-win situation for all parties. Keywords- Reward points; Asymmetric information; Retail contracts; O2O competition; Supply chain management